

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01      HELSIN 02626 01 OF 02 221411Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01  
SAJ-01 ACDA-07 TRSE-00 COME-00 EB-07 LAB-04 SIL-01  
/079 W

----- 093078 /23 45

R 221240Z DEC 76  
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0810  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 HELSINKI 2626

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR FI  
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL FROM FINNISH GOVT MAY BE INDE-  
FINITE: THEIR PARTICIPATION PROVED LARGELY UNSUCCESSFUL

1. SUMMARY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INDICATE COMMUNIST STAY IN  
OPPOSITION FOLLOWING RESIGNATION OF MIETTUNEN MAJORITY GOVT  
LAST SEPT MAY LAST INDEFINITELY. MODERATE COMMUNISTS, WHO  
FORM MAJORITY OF FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY (SKP), ENTERED GOVT  
A YEAR AGO OVER OPPOSITION OF HARDLINE MINORITY COMMUNIST  
INTRANSIGENCE WAS A PRIMARY FACTOR IN RESIGNATION OF PREVIOUS  
MIETTUNEN GOVT, AND ONE CONCLUSION WIDELY DRAWN WAS THAT THEY  
HAD PROVEN TO BE IMPOSSIBLE COALITION PARTNERS. SINCE LEAVING  
GOVT, COMMUNISTS HAVE MADE EFFORTS CLOSE RANKS WITH MODERATE  
MAJORITY MOVING TOWARD POSITIONS OF HARDLINE FACTION. NEW  
RADICAL POLITICAL PROGRAM UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED LAST MONTH  
BY SKP CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS INDICATION OF CURRENT SKP  
HARDER LINE AND EFFORT TOWARD UNITY. IT SEEMS TO SIGNAL COMMU-  
NIST RECOGNITION THAT PARTICIPATION IN GOVT NOT LIKELY SOON.  
REASONS FOR SKP DEVELOPMENTS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. WHILE THERE MAY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02      HELSIN 02626 01 OF 02 221411Z

BE EXTERNAL FACTORS, FINNISH DOMESTIC AND SKP INTERNAL CONSIDER-  
ATIONS ARE IMPORTANT, PARTICULARLY FINNISH ECONOMIC CRISIS AND  
ITS EFFECT ON PARTY. WHATEVER THE IMPLICATIONS ARE FOR OTHER  
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES -- AND FINLAND HAS UNIQUE CHARAC-  
TERISTICS -- COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN GOVT NOT LIKELY SOON BE  
REPEATED IN FINLAND. END SUMMARY.

2. A YEAR AGO (ON NOV 30, 1975) IN RECOGNITION OF FINNISH ECONOMIC CRISIS, PRES KEKKONEN FORCED CREATION OF MIETTUNEN FIVE PARTY GOVT COALITION COMPOSED OF THREE CENTRIST PARTIES, SDP AND SKDL. LATTER PARTY'S PRESENCE IN GOVT WAS A REPETITION OF KEKKONEN'S 1966-70 EXPERIMENT OF ATTEMPTING TO BRING "MODERATE" COMMUNISTS, WHO FORM MAJORITY WITHIN SKP, INTO MAINSTREAM OF NATIONAL POLITICAL LIFE AND TO ENGAGE THEM IN JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVT ECONOMIC DECISIONS. THE NEW GOVT WAS GIVEN DIRECTIVE TO "ASSURE EMPLOYMENT" AND AVOID LABOR UNREST.

3. THE "HARDLINE" OR "STALINIST" MINORITY WITHIN SKP ARGUED AGAINST COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION ON TRADITIONAL HARDLINE GROUNDS THAT SUCH PARTICIPATION WOULD BE FRUITLESS IN PROTECTING WORKER INTERESTS AND IN FURTHERING COMMUNIST PROGRAM BUT WOULD, RATHER, PLAY INTO HANDS OF NON-MARXIST PARTIES. MODERATE MAJORITY, HEADED BY SKP PARTY LEADER AARNE SAARINEN, ARGUED THAT GOVT PROGRAMS WOULD BE BETTER FOR WORKER INTERESTS WITH COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN GOVT THAN WITHOUT SUCH PARTICIPATION. SAARINEN INSISTED THAT IN ANY CASE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE; HE SAID ONLY FUTURE WOULD SHOW WHETHER DECISION TO PARTICIPATE CORRECT OR INCORRECT. OVER OBJECTIONS BOTH OF HARDLINERS AND, APPARENTLY, OF SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS AS WELL, MODERATES WENT INTO GOVT UNDER URGING OF PRES KEKKONEN.

4. HELSINKI 1953 DESCRIBES TRAVAILS OF MIETTUNEN MAJORITY GOVT. IN THAT GOVT THE MODERATE COMMUNISTS, UNDER PRESSURE FROM HARDLINE MINORITY FACTION, OPPOSED EFFORTS OF ITS GOVT  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03      HELSIN 02626 01 OF 02 221411Z

PARTNERS TO PURSUE ANTI-INFLATION ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM UTILIZING ORTHODOX FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES. THEY WERE PARTLY RESPONSIBLE, TOGETHER WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, FOR ACHIEVING A 1976 INCOMES POLICY AGREEMENT WHICH WAS MORE FAVORABLE TO WORKERS THAN EXPECTED OR THAN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WARRANTED, ACCORDING TO SOME ECONOMISTS. THE MODERATE COMMUNISTS SECURED KEKKONEN'S BLESSING IN MAY TO REMAIN IN GOVT EVEN WHILE OPPOSING NEW TAXES AFFECTING WORKING CLASS, SPECIFICALLY AN INCREASED SALES TAX. LATER THEY DEMANDED IN PREPARATIONS FOR 1977 BUDGET EXPENSIVE GOVT UNEMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES AND EMPLOYMENT CREATION PROGRAMS WITH LITTLE OR NO REGARD FOR BUDGET COSTS OR INFLATIONARY IMPACT. COMMUNIST INTRANSIGENCE IN GOVT ON THESE ISSUES WAS A PRIMARY FACTOR, TOGETHER WITH SDP AND CENTER PARTY DIFFERENCES OVER AGRICULTURAL POLICY, IN RESIGNATION OF MIETTUNEN MAJORITY GOVT THIS PAST SEPT.

5. ONE CONCLUSION WIDELY DRAWN UPON FALL OF MIETTUNEN GOVT WAS THAT MODERATE COMMUNISTS HAD PROVEN TO BE IMPOSSIBLE GOVT

COALITION PARTNERS, WHETHER FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN IDEOLOGY OR BECAUSE OF THEIR NEED TO PLACATE HARLINE SKP MINORITY. PRIME MINISTER MIETTUNEN PUBLICLY BLAMED COMMUNISTS' INTERNAL SPLIT AS BEING PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR FALL OF FIVE PARTY GOVT AND DOUBTED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN FUTURE TO INCLUDE COMMUNISTS IN COALITION GOVT AS LONG AS COMMUNISTS' INTERNAL DIFFERENCES CONTINUE. SDP LEADERS EXPRESSED SAME OPINION, CITING COMMUNISTS REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE ECONOMIC FACTS OF LIFE AND TO WORK WITHIN GOVT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE AND VIABLE PROGRAMS AS CHARACTERISTICS MAKING THEM IMPOSSIBLE COALITION PARTNERS. PRES KEKKONEN HIMSELF WAS REPORTED AS VERY DISAPPOINTED WITH COMMUNISTS' PERFORMANCE AND DOUBTFUL THEY COULD RETURN TO GOVT IN NEAR FUTURE. KEKKONEN THUS APPEARED LAY ASIDE FOR TIME BEING HIS LONG-HELD GOAL OF NORMAL PARTICIPATION BY MODERATE COMMUNISTS IN NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESSES.

6. AFTER LEAVING GOVT AND FOLLOWING LACKLUSTER PERFORMANCE BY SKDL (THE SKP ELECTION FRONT) IN OCTOBER MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 HELSIN 02626 01 OF 02 221411Z

(HELSINKI 2210, 2238), SKP HAS APPARENTLY BEEN MAKING SOME GENUINE EFFORTS TO CLOSE RANKS, WITH MODERATE MAJORITY MOVING SOMEWHAT LEFT TOWARD POSITIONS OF HARDLINE FACTION. WHILE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES STILL DIVIDE MODERATES AND HARDLINERS ON MANY ISSUES AND IT IS REPORTED INTENSE SQUABBLING IS STILL TAKING PLACE INTERNALLY, THE DIFFERENCES APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN PAPERED OVER IN AN EFFORT TO PRESENT AN EXTERNAL FACE OF UNITY. ONE INDICATION OF SKP'S STRIVING FOR UNITY OF ACTION WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 HELSIN 02626 02 OF 02 221431Z  
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03  
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01  
SAJ-01 ACDA-07 TRSE-00 COME-00 EB-07 LAB-04 SIL-01  
/079 W

----- 093252 /23 45

R 221240Z DEC 76

FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0811  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 HELSINKI 2626

SKP CHAIRMAN SAARINEN'S CALL LAST MONTH FOR A ONE-DAY GENERAL STRIKE, A POSITION THAT WAS UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED BY BOTH COMMUNIST FACTION IN CONFEDERATION OF FINNISH TRADE UNIONS (SAK). THE GENERAL STRIKE MOTION WAS DEFEATED IN SAK EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE BY UNITED OPPOSITION OF SDP LABOR REPRESENTATIVES. A MORE IMPORTANT INDICATION OF NEW SKP UNITY OF ACTION WAS LAST MONTH'S RADICAL NEW SKP PROGRAM CALLING FOR SOCIALIZATION OF MOST OF FINLAND'S MAJOR PRIVATE COMPANIES AND A REORIENTATION OF FINNISH FOREIGN TRADE LINKS AWAY FROM CAPITALIST COUNTRIES OF WEST AND TOWARDS COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE (HELSINKI 2492). THE PROGRAM, REPORTEDLY APPROVED UNANIMOUSLY BY SKP CENTRAL COMMITTEE, ADOPTS THESIS THAT FINNISH ECONOMIC CRISIS IS PART OF GENERAL CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM AND CANNOT BE SOLVED WITHIN CAPITALIST FRAMEWORK. PROGRAM GENERALLY IS SO FAR TO LEFT OF ACCEPTED PARAMETERS OF FINNISH POLITICAL GIVE-AND-TAKE AS TO SIGNAL FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES ABANDONMENT BY SKP MODERATES OF HOPE OF ACHIEVING THEIR ENDS THROUGH GOVT PARTICIPATION. SAARINEN TOLD POLCOUNS THAT IN PRINCIPLE COMMUNISTS STILL WILLING PARTICIPATE IN GOVT, BUT "IN PRACTICE" THE POSSIBILITY IS NOW REMOTE (HELSINKI A-135).  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02     HELSIN 02626 02 OF 02 221431Z

THUS, FINNISH COMMUNISTS BY THEIR OWN ACTIONS IN RECENT WEEKS APPEAR TO HAVE CONFIRMED JUDGMENT OF THEIR FORMER GOVT PARTNERS AND PRES KEKKONEN THAT EFFECTIVE COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN FINNISH GOVT IS NO LONGER VIABLE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. FULL REASONS FOR RECENT SKP DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE MOVE OF MODERATES OUT OF GOVT AND TOWARD THE HARDLINERS ON THE LEFT, ARE NOT YET CLEAR. SOME REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS DISCUSSING POSSIBLE EXTERNAL FACTORS, SUCH AS SOVIET INTEREST IN USING FINNISH COMMUNISTS TO COUNTERACT EUROCOMMUNIST TENDENCIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE. THIS EMBASSY LACKS SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO COMMENT ON SUCH REPORTS AT THIS TIME.

8. HOWEVER, SKP DEVELOPMENTS ARE ALSO EXPLAINABLE IN -- IF NOT NECESSARILY FULLY EXPLAINED BY -- TERMS OF PURELY FINNISH OR DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IS FINLAND'S ECONOMIC CRISIS. FINNISH COMMUNIST MAJORITY, WHILE MODERATE AND LARGELY NATIONALISTIC, IS NEVERTHELESS MARXIST,

AND ITS PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE MARXIST PRESCRIPTIONS. COMMUNIST MODERATES ARE APPARENTLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THEIR HARDLINE COLLEAGUES THAT NEW SKP ACTION PROGRAM REPRESENTS PROPER RESPONSE TO FINNISH ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. WHEREAS IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC PROSPERITY MODERATE FINNISH COMMUNISTS MAY BE MORE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE IN ORDER BUILD CENTER/LEFT COOPERATION, IN CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS THEY APPEAR TO HAVE TURNED TOWARD HARDER, MORE CONVENTIONAL, MARXIST POSITIONS. ANOTHER POSSIBLE REASON FOR APPARENT ACCEPTANCE BY MODERATE COMMUNISTS OF MORE TRADITIONAL MARXIST POSITIONS AND GREATER SHOW OF SKP UNITY MAY BE THAT MODERATE COMMUNISTS BELIEVE THEY FAILED TO ACHIEVE AS MUCH AS HOPED IN GOVT PARTICIPATION; CERTAINLY, THEIR PERFORMANCE IN GOVT WAS LABELED A DEFEAT BY HARDLINE COMMUNIST CRITICS. IN THIS SITUATION MODERATES MAY FEEL THAT, PARTICULARLY WITH DEEPENING OF ECONOMIC CRISIS, THEY ARE NOT IN GOOD POSITION PRESS THEIR  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03      HELSIN 02626 02 OF 02 221431Z

POSITIONS ON HARDLINE MINORITY. FINALLY, MODERATES MOVE TOWARD HARDLINERS MAY SIMPLY SIGNIFY THEIR RECOGNITION THAT THEIR FORMER COALITION PARTNERS WILL NOT SOON AGAIN BE INTERESTED IN COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN GOVT. SHOULD CONDITIONS CHANGE, MODERATES MAY AT SOME FUTURE DATE INTENSIFY INTERNAL SKP STRUGGLE AGAINST HARDLINERS.

9. THE FINNISH EXPERIENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN GOVT IS THE ONLY ONE IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE IMMEDIATE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO DRAW SWEEPING CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FINNISH EXPERIENCE FOR APPLICATION TO OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHERE COMMUNISTS MAY BE CLOSE TO PARTICIPATION IN GOVT. FOR GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL REASONS THE HIGHLY COMPLEX FINNISH/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP GIVES MANY CHARACTERISTICS TO FINNISH REALITY NOT FOUND IN OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. NEVERTHELESS, FINNISH EXPERIENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN GOVT DOES UNDERSCORE DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING MUTUALLY AGREEABLE POLICIES IN COALITION GOVT DURING TIMES OF ECONOMIC STRESS. WHATEVER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES, COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN GOVT APPARENTLY IS NOT AN EXPERIENCE THAT IS LIKELY SOON BE REPEATED IN FINLAND.

AUSTAD

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN



## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** WITHDRAWAL OF MEMBERSHIP, GOVERNMENT REFORM, POLITICAL STABILITY, COMMUNISTS, POLITICAL PARTIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 22 DEC 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976HELSIN02626  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760469-0995  
**From:** HELSINKI  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19761221/aaaaarp.tel  
**Line Count:** 268  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 16 APR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <16 APR 2004 by ElyME>; APPROVED <19 APR 2004 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** COMMUNIST WITHDRAWAL FROM FINNISH GOVT MAY BE INDE- FINITE: THEIR PARTICIPATION PROVED LARGELY UNSUCCESSFUL  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PGOV, FI  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006